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De Boever: De Boever on Watkin

William Watkin, The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis. London and New York:
Continuum, 2010. 236 pp. ISBN 9780826443249 (paper).
Reviewed by Arne De Boever, California Institute of the Arts
In the final chapter of his book The Literary Agamben, William Watkin—Professor of
Contemporary Literature and Philosophy at Brunel University, London, and a specialist in
modern poetry—turns to Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of a classic story: the encounter of
Oedipus and the Sphinx. As Watkin observes, Agamben discusses this story in the context of a
reflection on the theory of signification. If signification, or the operation of making meaning,
involves the leap across an abyss separating a word from its meaning or a signifier from a
signified, this leap tends to forget about the abyss that it crosses: about the bar (/) that, in
semiotic theory, separates the signifier from the signified—Sa/Sé, to use structuralist
shorthand—from the French “signifiant” and “signifié.” As Agamben sees it, both Oedipus and
the Sphinx are contributors to this situation: Oedipus, because he reveals meaning; the Sphinx,
because she hides it. And so we are stuck on either side of the bar. This amounts to what
Agamben calls, in no weak terms, a “sin” (Agamben 1993b, 138): Oedipus is in fact mistaken
when he reads the Sphinx’s riddle as a signifier that demands signification. What appears to be
the story of a victory—a story that is foundational for Western civilization—turns out to be the
story of a fall (the echoes from theology continue).
What if, Agamben asks, we restore the enigma of this story and experience the riddle of the
Sphinx as another kind of speaking: one that would, instead of hiding or revealing, throw us back
onto the bar separating signifier from signified—into the abyss that our treatment of language as
signification risks obscuring? The point of such a project would not be to stop speaking, even
though the flirtation with silence is evident (more on this later). It would be to start speaking
differently, paying careful attention to a fracture that haunts the way we are in the world. It
would mean to start speaking from a different experience of language.
I like rereading this chapter from Stanzas whenever I start a book by Agamben, or one of the
several excellent books that have been published about his work in recent years. (The best one is
still Leland de la Durantaye’s Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction.) It places a demand not
just on the reading but also on the writing experience, warning me about an Oedipus complex
that differs from the traditional psychoanalytic one. The sin of Agamben’s Oedipus is not so
much incest, as the chapter from Stanzas points out, but “hubris toward the power of the
symbolic in general” (Agamben 1993b, 138)—a power that Oedipus, in Agamben’s reading,
slights by decoding the riddle. What would it mean to read, and to write, from the place of the
critique of this hubris? Watkin invites this question when he asks if Agamben’s prose is close to
“the idea of prose” that he theorizes in his book of the same title. What would it mean to write
from the time after this Oedipus complex? What kind of pedagogy would remain once decoding
is off the table? What kind of theology, when the Sphinx is no longer hiding? What kind of
thought—what kind of poetic thinking—might the experience of the enigma of language
provoke? What logopoièsis?
Agamben writes in the chapter from Stanzas of a mode of speaking that is able to “[repel] the
uncanny by attracting it and assuming it within itself” (Agamben 1993b, 138). This enigmatic
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description resonates with the theory of art presented in the opening chapter of Agamben’s first
book, The Man Without Content, which Watkin discusses in detail in the first part of his book,
“On the Way to Logopoiesis.” Man Without Content opens with a long quotation from Friedrich
Nietzsche’s critique in The Genealogy of Morals of Immanuel Kant’s “definition of the beautiful
as disinterested pleasure” (Agamben 1999a, 1). Such an aesthetic provokes Nietzsche’s anger:
“the point is precisely to purify the concept of beauty . . . by filtering out the sensory
involvement of the spectator and thus to consider art from the point of view of its creator”
(Agamben 1999a, 2). It is via this critique of Kantian aesthetics that Agamben arrives at a
definition of the human-being-as-the-creator, of the human-being-as-the-being-that-has-technè
(or the ability to produce), as “the most uncanny thing” (Agamben 1999a, 4)—a characterization
that is taken from Sophocles’ Antigone. Technè, art or craft, is thus the most uncanny thing: the
spectator can welcome art as “interesting,” an adjective that really names “disinterested
pleasure” and reveals an art that has left the sphere of interest. On the side of the creator, on the
other hand, we find extreme risk, an art that is fundamentally dangerous and terrorizing, leading
Plato to ban it from his ideal city. Aesthetics has led art away from this link to terror, its uncanny
subversion. Agamben’s call for a “destruction of aesthetics” (Agamben 1999a, 6), then, arguably
runs parallel to his call for another mode of speaking, one that would be able to assume the
uncanny within itself—as enigma.
Indeed, it is difficult not to see this critique of aesthetics in relation to what Watkin argues is a
central notion in Agamben’s work, poièsis. With the notion of poièsis, we are much closer to the
potential captured by the verb “can” that Agamben in an essay titled “On Potentiality” has said to
be the subject of all of his work: not the actualization of signification, but the abyss or bar
separating signifier from signified. (That might be where the truly political potential of language
lies—from this perspective, there hasn’t been a more philosophical electoral campaign slogan
than “Yes, we can!” But Watkin, as I will elaborate below, is not interested in politics.) This is
the post-Oedipal potential that is the time/place of the many “thresholds” punctuating
Agamben’s work, the time/place of the “Preface” to his 1978 book Infancy and History, which
Watkin analyses in detail, in which Agamben theorizes the experience of language as the
potentiality not-to speak—as infancy, from the Latin “in-fans,” “not being able to speak (yet).”
It’s important to note that the “childlike” state evoked here is not part of some linear history that
must inevitably lead from not-speaking to speaking. Rather, infancy is a capacity that unworks
our speech, makes us speak in a different way. Here again, the flirtation with silence is evident.
Indeed, given all of this—Oedipus, Antigone, infancy—how is one to start reading Agamben?
To start writing about Agamben? And how did Agamben start writing? Wouldn’t the more
sensible option have been the Bartleby-option: to reply to the demand of reading and writing
using the formula of Herman Melville’s enigmatic scrivener—a figure that haunts Agamben’s
oeuvre—“I prefer not to”? Perhaps.
*
Some of the particular difficulty of Agamben’s writing—it cuts across multiple disciplines,
languages, time periods, more often than not drastically changing topics from one book to the
next—no doubt goes back to his analysis of the Oedipus complex of signification and, more
generally, to his investigation of language. One might even suggest that the radical project of the
work on language was such that critics simply did not know what to do with it. As Watkin points
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out in the opening pages of his book, it was not so much Agamben’s work on language that made
his name but what tends to be referred to as his “political” writings, and specifically his book
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. With a title like that, the book appears to belong
squarely in the field of political theory, and indeed, the first English-language book devoted to
Agamben’s writings—Politics, Metaphysics, and Death, edited by political theorist Andrew
Norris—was a collection of essays on Homo Sacer that focused on politics. With its other
emphasis on metaphysics, the book already appeared to bring together two Agambens, as Toni
Negri was quick to observe: a metaphysical one, “perpetually forced into a confrontation with
the idea of death”; and a political one “who, through immersion in the work of philology and
linguistic analysis, attains the power of being (that is, he rediscovers pieces or elements of being,
by manipulating and constructing them)” (Negri qtd. 2).
Over the years, however, the critical approach has become more nuanced, with several
collections—most programmatically, The Work of Giorgio Agamben, edited by Justin Clemens,
Nick Heron, and Alex Murray; I contributed a chapter to this book (to avoid confusion, I am the
“Anne” De Boever referenced in Watkin’s footnotes!)—insisting on the importance of the work
on language for both camps, and uncovering the close connections between language and politics
throughout Agamben’s oeuvre.
Watkin’s book appears to complete the swing of the pendulum, first summarizing Homo Sacer in
a page and a half in order to focus, with the joy of the creative writer and thinker, on Agamben’s
literary side: “Attend, if you will, beyond the learned and almost overwhelming conversation
between the two Agambens and his many critics, to the tones of the term, the literary Agamben,
adventurer in poiesis” (3), as the book’s epic incipitgoes. The political Agamben is “the one
about whom I will have the least to say in the chapters that follow” (2), Watkin states. He is
laboring hard in the book’s opening pages and at other transitional moments in the writing—and
consciously so, as the humor in his writing reveals: “And so I present for general perusal and
perhaps initial skepticism or even weary derision my theory of logo-poiesis” (117-8)—to
separate out a third Agamben, a literary one, from the metaphysical and the political Agambens.
Well aware that there is only one Agamben, Watkin’s project is nevertheless to introduce the
reader to what he perceives to be a third and crucial component in Agamben’s thought, without
much consideration for anything else. The word “politics” does not even have an entry in his
book’s index (“biopolitical” does, but it occurs only two times). When, after his close reading of
the “Oedipus and the Sphinx” chapter, he moves into a brief discussion of Agamben’s book, The
Coming Community, that promising view onto something non-literary ends rather abruptly, with
Watkin asking the reader to please “[f]orgive this digression into the biopolitical realm of the
ethics of alterity” (181). It’s as if ethics and politics—two key components of Agamben’s
thought—have been banned into what some may want to call, using the notion loosely, a state of
exception.
The thought to which this relentless focus on the literary introduces us is logopoièsis, defined in
the book as “a procedure of thinking through making” (77). (The definition goes against Plato’s
age-old separation of poetry from philosophy.) Although Agamben (as the text of a postcard that
is included in the book reveals) was initially unconvinced by this term, he in fact came to
appreciate the ways in which it captures a model in which “the poem-thought commences due to
the presence of semiotic conventional rule-based constraint” while at the same time it “already
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prefigures its development and cessation”: “As it progresses it does so by always simultaneously
going on and looking back, by flowing and interrupting said flow, by submitting thought to a
constraining linearity and exploding linearity through a translinear planar rhythmic structure”
(200-1). There is a “work” that takes place here, a “making” or poièsis, as Watkin’s concept
suggests. But it is a peculiar kind of work: it leads to cessation, an interruption and explosion. In
fact, it might be closer to a kind of un-work that circulates in Agamben’s work under different
names: G.W.F. Hegel’s term Aufhebung is certainly one of them, and next to “unwork” the
English translations also sometimes use the phrase “render inoperative,” which reveals
Agamben’s proximity to Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, and Jean-Luc Nancy. Again, one
can see the flirtation with silence in the description above (Watkin spends a good amount of time
discussing silence throughout his book)—but that is not exactly what is going on here. Infancy is
not silence, and it’s not speech either. It’s the potentiality not-to speak which, as I have argued
elsewhere [1], is in fact much closer to a certain strand of Enlightenment thought that insists on
“separat[ing] out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no
longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think” (Foucault 114). Agamben, for his
part, follows Duns Scotus’ definition of contingency, as “not something that is not necessary or
eternal, but something whose opposite could have happened in the very moment in which it
happened” (Scotus qtd. Agamben 1999b, 262). “At the same instant,” he explains, “I can thus act
in one way and be able to act otherwise (or not to act at all).” One understands that his notion of
contingency is in fact very close to the “possibility” that Michel Foucault in his text on the
Enlightenment is theorizing (Agamben 1999b, 262). To unwork language so that it would
assume within it the potentiality not-to speak—to assume within the home of language the
unhomely terror of infancy: it’s in this partly frightening, properly adventurous experience (to
recall Watkin’s title) that Agamben’s thought takes place.
Watkin’s book starts out with a section titled “Projection: There is Language” in which he moves
through Infancy and History, Stanzas, Language and Death, Remnants of Auschwitz and The
Idea of Prose to lay out Agamben’s theory of language, or rather its first and foremost
experience: that there is language. The rest of the book is divided into two “episodes”: one, “On
the Way to Logopoiesis,” which revolves largely (after an opening section on logopoièsis)
around Agamben’s book on aesthetics, The Man Without Content; and two, “Adventures in
Logopoiesis,” which focuses more specifically on tautology, enjambment, and caesura as three
key figures of Agamben’s poetic thought. Nearly everything of literary significance in
Agamben’s work is covered, and in detail: the readings are meticulous, often going through
particularly dense passages line by line in order to explain them. (On his blog,
http://williamwatkin.blogspot.com/, Watkin showcases his talent for unpacking particularly
gnarly concepts or problems in Agamben’s thought in, say, one thousand words or less.) There
are moments of genuine insight, as for example when, in the discussion of Alexander Garcia
Düttmann’s analysis of Agamben’s use of the Italian term “medio” in The Idea of Prose—
Düttmann challenges the English translation of “medio” as “middle term” and argues instead that
it ought to be translated as “midst” or “milieu”—Watkin quite simply suggests that “mean” is the
appropriate translation (62-3). When it comes to thinking language, Agamben is certainly a
thinker of language as a pure medium, a mean without end—“balance, stillness, tension,
suspension: ‘dialectic at a standstill’” (63). The image for this in Agamben’s work is, as Watkin
discusses, “the perfectly bare writing tablet on which nothing had yet been written” (Agamben
qtd. 61).

BRYN MAWR REVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE, Volume 10, Number 1 (Fall 2012)

https://repository.brynmawr.edu/bmrcl/vol10/iss1/3

4

De Boever: De Boever on Watkin

The discussion of Agamben that is presented in the book is most definitely valuable for
specialists of Agamben’s work, and scholars of language and literature in general. But I will
confess that I had some difficulty remaining invested in Watkin’s discussion of the literary
Agamben due to the lack of any discussion of that other Agamben, the political one. Reading
Watkin’s book, I was reminded of Agamben’s essay about the eccentric art historian Aby
Warburg, which opens with a peculiar sentence: “This essay seeks to situate a discipline that, in
contrast to many others, exists but has no name” (Agamben 1999b, 89). Warburg’s unorthodox
way of doing art history was such a “discipline”: the panels of Warburg’s unfinished atlas project
Mnemosyne combine in constellations heterogeneous but connected images as part of an “art
history without a text.” I fear that the discipline of studying the literary Agamben may be one of
those many others that are mentioned here, namely a discipline that has a name—“the literary
Agamben”—but doesn’t really exist. For I think we must remember that at the end of the day,
there is no literary Agamben, in the same way that there is no political Agamben. Each of these
are analytical straw-men through which critics have tried to approach a vast body of work that
risks to intimidate even the most experienced comparatist.
*
Let me elaborate on this point by making a brief detour through a short text Agamben wrote in
January 2004 for the French newspaper Le Monde. [2] It’s a political text, so Watkin does not
refer to it in his book. Titled “No to Bio-Political Tattooing,” the text explains why Agamben
had cancelled a course he was supposed to teach at New York University in March of that same
year. The reason was a new regulation that required “whoever wants to go to the United States
with a visa” to be “put on file” and “leave their fingerprints when they enter the country.” The
problem Agamben has with this regulation “concerns the juridical-political status . . . of citizens
of the so-called democratic states where we live”: we are being convinced “to accept as the
humane and normal dimensions of our existence, practices of control that had always been
properly considered inhumane and exceptional.” Agamben characterizes this development as a
“progressive animalization of man,” stating that in modern democratic states, “the most private
and incommunicable aspect of subjectivity: I mean the body’s biological life” is “filed away” as
if it were dangerous, suspect, and even criminal. The model for modern politics, he concludes, is
no longer the Greek city-state or polis but the camp. “From Athens to Auschwitz”: that is how
Agamben characterizes the trajectory of Western democracy.
This text is problematic for a number of reasons, and not just because of its comparison of a new
visa regulation to Auschwitz. (While Agamben explains that the comparison is a philosophical
thesis and not a historical one, one cannot help but wonder whether such a comparison is not
simply giving philosophy—and the practice of comparison—a bad reputation. That’s certainly
one of the other reasons why Agamben’s writing risks driving even the most experienced
comparatist up the wall.) One could also question Agamben’s use of the word “animalization”
(supposedly lifted from the work of Foucault, but no reference is given) to describe the effects of
biopolitics on human life: does biopolitics really reduce human life to animal life? Or does it
reduce human life to a life that is different from both human and animal life? Finally, is
withdrawing from the US really an effective response to the problems that Agamben is
highlighting? And what privilege does his call for action—he hopes that “other European
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intellectuals and teachers” will follow his example—presume? Not everyone has the luxury of
being able to cancel a course in the US while another teaching position awaits one back home.
However, “No to Bio-Political Tattooing” is also a helpful text because it reveals, in a highly
condensed form, the three most important components of Agamben’s thought: politics—human
life—language. Indeed, the text expresses Agamben’s resistance to the political attempt to render
human life communicable. Instead, the philosopher insists on its privacy and incommunicability.
What we are invited to think here is, precisely, the relation between politics, life, and language
rather than any of these components alone.
Now, what Watkin does with this constellation is: he focuses entirely on the “literary”
Agamben—on the Agamben who is interested in language, linguistics, the theory of
signification, semiotics and semantics, poetry, art, and so on. His aim is to foreground this
Agamben and to theorize him as an “adventurer in logopoiesis”: as a philosopher who has
seriously considered poetry, has ventured in “poetic thinking” (or logopoièsis), and come away
from it with some major insights. So major, in fact—so “complex and subtle,” as Watkin puts it
in one case—that he does not hesitate to describe them, in one particular instance, as “counting
as one of the most profound reflections on the literary ever penned in any language at any time.”
I am a literary critic, but I know this is not why I became interested in Agamben’s work. It
wasn’t because of Agamben’s reflections on the literary, even though that was a crucial part of it.
I got hooked because of Agamben’s treatment of political problems like the ones addressed in
the Le Monde text. And the literary Agamben only makes sense to me in this political light—in
the same way that the political one needs the literary dimension if it wants to be fully
appreciated. Separating out the politics from the literature makes no sense in the same way that
separating out the literature from the politics doesn’t.
The issue is, in essence, one of comparison. Of course, one can find comparison at work in
Agamben’s writings at many different levels, and Watkin’s book certainly reflects some of this
when it brings literature and philosophy—logos and poièsis—together. But the surgical removal
of ethics and politics—to the point of Watkin asking the reader for forgiveness for including a
paragraph on both—comes at a high cost.
One could populate a pretty exciting comparative literature department with specialists of
Agamben’s work. Such a department would include, of course, someone like Watkin—someone
who specializes in linguistics, literature, the theory of signification, et cetera. It would also have
to include, just for starters, a philosopher, a political theorist, a legal scholar, an art historian, a
theologian. All of these specialists would need to be familiar with the entire history of their field,
going at least from Antiquity until the present. They would need to have a working knowledge of
multiple languages, and have to be willing to venture (as most comparatists are) across the
various disciplines represented in their department. Finally, they would also have to have read
extensively outside of what tends to qualify as falling under the purview of traditional
disciplines—they would also have to have an interest in, say, nylon stockings or the art porn of
Chloë des Lysses, since both are discussed in Agamben’s writings.
One of Agamben’s early translators, Princeton Professor of Comparative Literature Daniel
Heller-Roazen, offers this kind of perspective in his own work, ranging from his study of “the
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poetics of contingency,” Fortune’s Faces, to The Fifth Hammer: Pythagoras and the
Disharmony of the World. As I suggested earlier on, Agamben himself has arguably shaped his
method after Warburg. Warburg is presented in Agamben’s essay on his work as the inventor of
a discipline that exists, but has no name. “Comparative Literature” would not be a bad name for
it. Describing Warburg’s method, Agamben suggests that “[w]hat is unique and significant about
Warburg’s method as a scholar is . . . that he always directs his research toward the overcoming
of the borders of art history. It is as if Warburg were interested in this discipline solely to place
within it the seed that would cause it to explode” (Agamben 1999b, 90). This quote takes us back
to the postcard Agamben sent to Watkin, where the word “explode” is used as well. (In addition,
Watkin describes Agamben’s Homo Sacer as an “explosive” book [1].) In the footnotes to the
Warburg essay, Agamben describes how the books in Warburg’s library were ordered, deriving
from it a principle for good research:
Warburg ordered his books not by the alphabetical or arithmetical criteria used in large libraries,
but rather according to his interests and his system of thought, to the point of rearranging the
order of his books whenever his methods of research changed. The law guiding the library was
that of the "good neighbor," which states that the solution of one’s problem is contained not in
the book one is looking for but in the one beside it. (Agamben 1999b, 284 n9)
This “law” also guides Agamben’s project—de la Durantaye places it at the beginning of his
own book on Agamben, evoking it as the principle that will guide his investigations.
When, years later, Agamben comes to describe his own method as trying “to identify in the texts
and contexts on which I work what Feuerbach used to call the philosophical element, that is to
say, the point of their Entwicklungsfähigkeit (literally, capacity to be developed)” (Agamben
2009, 12-3), this language takes us straight back to Warburg. All of this to say that Agamben is
at heart a comparatist, and it is worth asking what happens to this core aspect of his work when it
is bound in a book like The Literary Agamben—no matter how valuable the readings presented
in it might be.
After finishing The Literary Agamben, I was left wondering whether Agamben’s work can be
fully appreciated from that literary side. If “living thought” is what characterizes the Italian
philosophical tradition, as Roberto Esposito has argued, i.e., if thinking is really about opening
oneself up to the chaotic, messy world—then a book such as The Literary Agamben risks leading
us away from there into a thought that is rich but ultimately quite tautological (like Agamben’s
thinking on language itself), limited to its own ways of reasoning. To include a reference to
another thinker who appears a number of times in Watkin’s book: imagine a book that focuses
only, without any consideration of the other aspects of his thought, on set theory in the
philosophy of Alain Badiou. What would be the effect of this kind of book on the project of
Badiou’s philosophy?
It may be that Watkin himself has already realized that this one book on Agamben cannot be
enough. He has reportedly finished a second monograph on Agamben, this time on Agamben as
a philosopher of indifference. Together, the two books may offer a more complete picture of
Agamben as a philosopher who starts from an indifferent theory of language (“there is
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language”) but was able to make that matter—ethically, politically—in ways that are still waiting
to be assessed.
Notes
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[2] Giorgio Agamben, "No to Bio-Political Tatooing," Le Monde (January 10 2004).
http://www.ratical.org/ratville/CAH/totalControl.html
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